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The Restructuring of the Relationship
Between Shareholders and the Corporate
Entity: Reflections on Berle and Means
Rafael A. Porrata-Doria, Jr.*
I. Introduction
This Article is an examination and reassessment of Professors
Berle and Means' seminal theory of the nature of the relationship
between a/corporation, its shareholders, and its management.' Be-
cause of its importance to modern corporate law,' this relationship is
examined in the context of two recent corporate antitakeover defen-
sive techniques:$ the creation of super common stock, and manage-
ment's deliberate discrimination against suspected hostile
shareholders.
Professors Berle and Means were the first to argue that, because
of changes in the nature of the corporation and the economy, man-
agement, not shareholders, assumed control of the corporate entity.
4
Management achieved control by taking charge of the machinery of
shareholder voting." Berle and Means concluded that the modern
* Associate Professor of Law, Temple University. B.A., M.A. 1974, University of Penn-
sylvania; J.D. 1977, Yale Law School. I would like to thank Professors Marina Angel, John
M. Lindsey, Handsel B. Minyard, and K.G. Jan Pillai of Temple Law School and Professor
Roger Dennis of the Rutgers Law School-Camden, for their insights on earlier drafts. I would
also like to thank my research assistant, Anita Mellone, Temple '90, for her assistance.
1. This theory is set forth in A.A. BERLE & G.C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) [hereinafter BERLE & MEANS]. In 1967, a revised edition of
this work appeared, in which the authors argued that the American industrial experience since
1932 confirmed and affirmed the validity of their original assertions. All citations to Berle and
Means' work in this article will be citations to the revised edition (1967).
2. See, e.g., E.S. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER (1981); J.W.
HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1780-1970 (1970); Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L.
REV. 1145 (1932); Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations, Critical Reflections on
the Rule of 'One Share, One Vote', 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1970).
3. For a discussion of recent hostile corporate takeovers and the defensive techniques
developed to resist them, see infra notes 72-103 and accompanying text.
4. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 64-65.
5. Id. at 78-84. In effect, management usurped control of the corporation from its share-
holders by nominating slates of candidates for the entity's board of directors and controlling
the agents who cast proxy ballots on behalf of the shareholders. Since share ownership in
modern corporations is widely distributed among thousands of shareholders so that no single
shareholder or group has enough votes to control the results of the election for directors, most
shareholders become apathetic and either do not vote or blindly approve management's slate.
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shareholder was not an owner of the corporate entity but a rentier6
or type of unsecured creditor, with no rights other than a satisfactory
return on investment and the right to liquidity.7 This theory of the
nature of the corporate entity has been the subject of much discus-
sion and debate, and has been enthusiastically adopted by a number
of authors.8
Traditional theorists view the corporate relationship as one in
which the shareholders, as owners of the corporation, control the cor-
porate entity through their voting power, which enables the share-
holders to elect the enterprise's board of directors and to approve
fundamental corporate transactions.9 As corporate entities grow
larger and more complex, the shareholders, for purposes of effi-
ciency, delegate the day to day operations of the enterprise"0 to a
group of agents called management.
This Article explores Berle and Means' reasoning and theory
about the nature of the modern publicly traded corporation, and
shows that their perception and cry for legal reform have already
been substantially implemented in modern corporate regulation. This
Article also demonstrates that Berle and Means' theory may, per-
haps, furnish another explanation for the recent explosion in hostile
corporate takeovers, mergers, and acquisitions." Hostile takeovers' 2
have, of course, engendered a rash of defensive tactics through which
the management of potential target corporations have attempted to
protect themselves.' 3
Two recent antitakeover defensive techniques, designed to
thwart hostile takeovers both before and after an offer is made by a
raider, are examined. Additionally, this examination illustrates the
relationship between Berle and Means' theory and increased hostile
The resulting board of directors would, of course, be subservient to management. Id.
6. A rentier is defined as a "man of independent means;" a "holder of an annuity;" or
one who "has a small private income ... a small investor." CASSELL'S FRENCH-ENGLISH EN-
GLISH-FRENCH DICTIONARY 639 (rev. ed. 1981).
7. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 300-02.
8. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
9. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 125-26.
10. Id. at 123.
11. According to one estimate, 2,543 merger deals, with a total price of $122 billion,
were struck during 1984 alone. O'Connell, Do Mergers Really Work?, Bus. WK., June 3,
1985, at 88. This trend does not appear to be abating; on the contrary, an examination of the
Wall Street Journal on almost any given day will reveal several ongoing takeover battles.
12.1 See infra notes 72-103 and accompanying text.
13. See Block & Miller, The Responsibilities and Obligations of Corporate Directors in
Takeover Contests, 11 SEC. REG. L. 44 (1983). See also McCord, Limiting Defensive Tac-
tics in Tender Offers: A Model Act for the Protection of Shareholder Decision Making, 17
SEC. L. REv. 415, 417-22 (1985) (limitation of defensive techniques is justifiable on grounds of
economic efficiency and limiting conflicts between interests of management and shareholders).
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takeover activity.
The first defensive technique is the entrenchment of corporate
control in a minority group of shareholders by abandonment of the
traditional one-share one-vote requirement for common shares, and
the development of super common stock with multiple voting rights
and second class common stock with reduced or nonexistent voting
rights. 14 This development has been the subject of intense debate.15
Indeed, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) recently issued a regulation that severely restricts the public
trading of these securities.16
The second defensive technique is discriminatory treatment by
management of a shareholder whose reputation or behavior indicates
a hostile intent aimed at current corporate management. This tech-
nique, recently approved by the Delaware Supreme Court, 7 has
been enthusiastically espoused in at least one recodification of the
corporate statutes of a major industrial state. 8
The author believes that management's wholesale embrace of
dual class recapitalizations and of discriminatory treatment of hos-
tile shareholders is based on an extrapolation of Berle and Means'
14. See, e.g., Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 A.2d 271 (Del. Ch. 1986);
Packer v. Yampol, No. 86-8432 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, De file);
National Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co., No. 83-7278 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1983) (LEXIS,
States library, De file); American Pacific Corp. v. Super Food Servs., Inc., No. 82-7020 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 6, 1982) (LEXIS, States library, De file); Societe Holding Ray D'Albion S.A. v.
Saunders Leasing Sys., Inc., No. 81-6648 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 1981) (LEXIS, States library,
De file); Telvest, Inc. v. Olson, No. 79-5798 (Del. Ch. March 8, 1979) (LEXIS, States library,
De file); Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977); Kersten v. Pioneer
Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Iowa 1985); ASARCO Inc. v. Court, 611 F. Supp.
468 (D.N.J. 1985); Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. N.L. Indus., 644 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), affid, 825 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1987); Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks,
Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690
(E.D. Pa. 1986).
15. See, e.g., FISCHEL, ORGANIZED EXCHANGES AND THE REGULATION OF DUAL CLASS
COMMON STOCK (1986); Dent, Dual Class Capitalization: A Reply to Professor Seligman, 54
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 725 (1986); Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. LAW
& EcON. 395 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel-Voting]; Kerbel, An Examination of
Nonvoting and Limited Voting Common Shares-Their History, Legality and Validity, 15
SEC. REG. LJ. 37 (1987); Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA.
L. REV. 259 (1967); Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1427 (1964); Ratner, supra note 2; Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights:
The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687 (1986); Note,
Corporate Voting: Majority Control, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 218 (1988); Note, Dual Class
Recapitalization and Shareholder Voting Rights, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 106 (1987).
16. See Voting Rights Listing Standards-Disenfranchisement Rule, Release No. 34-
25891, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1124 (July 15, 1988) [hereinafter Release
No. 25891] and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Regulation 19c-4, to be codified at 17 C.FR
§ 240.19c-4. The effective date of the Rule is July 7, 1988.
17. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
18. See Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1444, No. 177, Commonwealth of Pennsylva-
nia; 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101-7726 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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thesis relating to shareholder vote. In essence, it is acceptable under
these techniques for management to defend against hostile takeovers
by diluting the vote of the majority of the shareholders or by dis-
criminating against the raider because, as Berle and Means noted,
shareholders' votes are irrelevant since most shareholders have no
desire to have, and do not use, their right to vote. This analysis, how-
ever, is not supported by the evidence.
Clearly, Berle and Means' theory has been overextended and
overappliedt0 and, perhaps, no longer reflects reality." Specifically,
this Article concludes that the extension of the two takeover defense
mechanisms represents an unwise and dangerous precedent.
II. The Shareholder and the Corporate Entity: From Owner to
Rentier
Traditional theorists seeking to explain the nature of the corpo-
ration believe that a corporation is a voluntary association of individ-
uals who have entered into a social contract to conduct a common
activity and divide the risks and profits therefrom. 1 The individual
parties (the shareholders) to this contract are in fact the owners of
the entity and control its operations.2 Managers are actually the
shareholders' agents and conduct the day to day business of the en-
terprise for the benefit of the shareholders. 3
Although considered a creature of contract,2' the corporation
appears to have been conceptualized as a creature analogous to the
state and, as such, was to be operated in a democratic fashion: by
the majority vote of its members, the shareholders. 5 This conceptu-
alization appears to be borrowed directly from political theory. The
system of corporate governance advocated by the traditional view re-
19. See infra notes 72-103, 160-62 and accompanying text.
20. Id.
21. See Easterbrook & Fischel-Voting, supra note 15, at 401.
22. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 123-24.
23. Id. at 293-94; Baysinger & Butler, Antitakeover Amendments, Managerial En-
trenchment and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 VA. L. REV. 1257, 1271
(1985).
24. Indeed, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have gone as far as to describe corporate
law as "a standard form contract for issues of corporate structure. To the extent they antici-
pate the desires of the contracting parties, these off the rack principles reduce the number of
items to be negotiated and the costs of negotiating them." Easterbrook & Fischel-Voting,
supra note 15, at 401. On the other hand, a number of other commentators argue that the
analysis of the corporate enterprise as a "nexus" of contracts is seriously flawed. See, e.g.,
CLARK, AGENCY COSTS VERSUS FIDUCIARY DUTIES (1985) in PRATT & ZECKHAUSER, PRINCI-
PALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURES OF BUSINESS 55-64, 66-69 (1985); Brudney, Corporate
Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985).
25. Easterbrook & Fischel-Voting, supra note 15, at 395-97; Ratner, supra note 2, at 9-
II.
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sembles a system of political checks and balances: shareholders,
through a number of specific techniques, can limit and counteract
the otherwise absolute power of the managers of the enterprise. In-
deed, the concept of corporate democracy appears to be more politi-
cal than legal in nature.26
The legal system bestowed upon the shareholders significant
rights and powers meant to insure control of the entity and its opera-
tions. For example, shareholders had the exclusive right to elect
27
and remove28 the members of the board of directors. Moreover, man-
agement assured shareholders that the determination and distribu-
tion of dividends would not impair the corporation's capital.2" Fur-
thermore, the shareholders had the exclusive power to alter the
corporation's articles of incorporation, the fundamental contract doc-
ument which, among other things, determined the corporation's capi-
tal structure." Through the institution of preemptive rights, the cor-
poration's shareholders also had the right to ensure that their
proportionate interest in the enterprise would remain undiluted
should the incorporated entity seek to expand.3" Thus, the sharehold-
ers could check and balance the powers of the enterprise's manag-
ers.3 2 The traditional model, in effect, viewed the corporation as an
entity whose affairs would be guided by management for the benefit
of the owners, each of whom would take an active (but indirect) part
in the corporation's business through the mechanism of the share-
holder vote. 3a
In 1932, Professors Berle and Means postulated that, because of
enormous changes in the United States economy in the late nine-
26. There appears to be a close connection between the fields of law and political sci-
ence. Indeed, American political science has been viewed as having an extremely "legalistic"
approach that views political science as primarily the study of constitutions and legal codes.
A.C. ISAAK, SCOPE AND METHODS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 33 (1969). One factor that has been
advanced as an explanation for this phenomenon is that in the 19th century most American
political scientists received their graduate training in European, usually German, universities.
The political science professors in these institutions were members of law faculties, and tended
to think in an extremely legalistic fashion. Id.
27. BERLE & MEANS, supra note I, at 196.
28. Id. at 129.
29. Id. at 124, 135-36.
30. Id. at 186-95.
31. Preemptive rights are rights given to shareholders by a corporation (either by statute
or by the corporation's articles of incorporation) allowing the shareholders, each time the cor-
poration issues new shares, to purchase a percentage of the new issue that equals his or her
percentage of ownership of the already outstanding stock (of the same class) of the corpora-
tion. The purpose of these rights is to ensure the preservation of the balance of power among
shareholders in the event of an expansion of the corporate entity. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW
719 (1986). In public corporations, preemptive rights are very rare. Id.
32. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 133-35, 160-63.
33. Id. at 293-94; Easterbrook & Fischel-Voting, supra note 15, at 399.
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teenth and early twentieth centuries, the traditional model had, in
fact, become obsolete. 4 Berle and Means saw the American econ-
omy as being dominated by enormous conglomerates with far-flung
and diversified operations whose shares were owned by thousands of
widely dispersed, small shareholders.3 5 These conglomerates shared a
remarkable phenomenon: control by management, not by sharehold-
ers."6 These managers were not the traditional entrepreneurs who
were also shareholders, but technocrats possessing unique skills who
became, in effect, professional managers." Since the corporation's
owners were numerous and widely dispersed, and none of them pos-
sessed a large enough holding to achieve control of the corporation,
the corporate proxy became the only vehicle by which shareholder
voting could be effectuated. Management, by seizing control of the
proxy machinery, could in effect nominate and elect directors who
represented its interests rather than the interests of the sharehold-
ers.3 The individual shareholder, relatively powerless because of the
small size of his holding, would generally acquiesce and elect man-
agement's slate of candidates.3 9 The individual shareholder's voting
power, therefore, became worthless and irrelevant.40
This new breed of corporate managers would, of course, seek to
perpetuate itself in office and strengthen its ability to direct the cor-
poration's affairs.41 By perpetuating themselves in office, these corpo-
rate technocrats could enjoy the perquisites of power and prestige in
a major enterprise without taking any of the financial risks to which
the entrepreneurs who had founded the enterprise had been exposed.
Surely this was a desirable outcome.42 Management achieved this
objective by influencing the legal system to eliminate many of the
traditional powers allocated to shareholders and, in turn, depositing
those powers with the board of directors.43
Berle and Means saw that, as a result of this separation be-
tween share ownership and control, the shareholder was, in effect,
left with a piece of paper that represented loose expectations that
management would run the enterprise in a way that would benefit
34. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 58-65.
35. Id. at 44-54.
36. Id. at 78-83; E.S. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 9-14 (1981).
37. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 112-14.
38. Id. at 82.
39. Id. at 80-82.
40. Id. at 76-82. See also Easterbrook & Fischel-Voting, supra note 15, at 403-06.
41. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 113-16.
42. Id. at 115.
43. Id. at 128-40.
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the shareholder and that management would not abuse its position to
the shareholder's detriment." With no ability to control or to make
demands on management, the shareholder, whose capital had been
risked to create and expand the corporate enterprise, was left totally
subservient to management's will.' 5 The share of the corporation's
assets was valuable only to the extent that management and the cor-
poration performed in such a way as to increase the value of the
corporation's assets.'
Why would any rational human being utilize his scarce capital
in this fashion? Because, as Berle and Means noted, the share-
holder's investment was highly liquid and could be easily disposed of
in the securities markets. 7 Therefore, the shareholder exchanged
control and ownership of the corporate entity for liquidity. The
shareholder's expectations about the value of his investment and his
entitlement to dividends are perennially evaluated (and hopefully
validated) by the securities markets. 4 In short, the investor is gam-
bling that his investment will increase in value, which will result in a
profit upon resale. Management, therefore, has an especially strong
incentive to produce a strong corporate performance since a weak
performance, either real or perceived, will cause the value of the cor-
poration's shares to decrease and the shareholders to dispose of their
investment.' 9
Berle and Means' analysis has been the subject of much discus-
sion,50 and a number of authors enthusiastically adopted Berle and
Means' thesis.51 Berle and Means' analysis sets forth a theory of cor-
porate development, under which the corporate entity has a life and
inevitable development independent of its shareholders. In the birth
and infancy of the corporate entity, a group of entrepreneurs enter
into a contract whereby resources are pooled into a common enter-
prise in return for shares of the resulting corporation. In an infant
corporation, shareholders normally constitute management and are
involved in the day to day operations of the corporate business. Thus,
in an infant corporation, ownership of shares constitutes total control
44. Id. at 244.
45. Id.
46. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 250-51.
47. Id. at 248-52.
48. Id. at 252.
49. Id. at 250. See also E.S. HERMAN, supra note 36, at 103-13.
50. See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at xxii.
51. See, e.g., A. CHAYES, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND THE RULE OF LAW IN THE
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25 (1959); E.S. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPO-
RATE POWER (1981); R.B. STEVENSON, JR., CORPORATION AND INFORMATION (1980).
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of the corporate entity. This infant corporation will, generally, be
quite small in size. As the corporation seeks to expand, its managing
shareholders will desire to acquire additional capital by selling
shares to individuals who are not interested in becoming, and who
are not permitted to become, involved in the day to day operations of
the business, but who are content to leave this task to the original
owner-managers. In such an adolescent corporation, management
begins to emerge as a distinct group with interests different from
those of the shareholders. Shareholders, because of their still limited
numbers, continue to retain a measure of control of the enterprise
although the newer shareholders have a lesser degree of control than
the original shareholders of the infant corporation. The adolescent
corporation eventually becomes a mature corporation,52 the entity
described by Berle and Means. Berle and Means implied that this
evolution is the inevitable result of the economy's development and
expansion.
Berle and Means' theory, in effect, leaves the shareholder as a
mere rentier, the owner of a piece of paper that no longer represents
mere ownership of a portion of the corporate entity, but which has
intrinsic value of its own, and which may entitle its owner to a spe-
cific stream of payments in the future. Indeed, the value of such a
piece of paper is related more to the market's perception of its value
and to the public's perception of the accuracy and stability of the
market than to the profitability of its underlying corporate entity.
Thus, it is possible, as happened on October 19, 1987, for shares to
lose their value and for the market to crash in spite of the fact that
the underlying corporate entities remain profitable and expanding. 3
52. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at viii-xxxviii.
53. See, e.g., Evaluating the October '87 Crash, N.J. L.J., Nov. 17, 1988, at 53 (The
October 1987 stock market crash was caused by overvaluation of stocks linked to the success
of the policies of the Reagan administration, the takeover boom, and the absence of high
inflation.); It's Time for America, Bus. WK., Nov. 16, 1987, at 158-63 (Deficit spending and
excessive foreign debt caused the crash of 1987.); The Stock Market is a Lousy Economic
Forecaster, FORBES, Nov. 30, 1987, at 32-34; Why the Market Crash Won't Cause a Reces-
sion, FORBES, Nov. 30, 1987, at 120-24 (The stock markets respond to their "internal momen-
tums" and are not an accurate reflection of the economy.); Different Worlds: Crash is Viewed
with Detachment on Main Street, Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1987, at 1, 19 (The October 1987 stock
market crash was not perceived as a serious event by those outside the financial community.);
Black Monday: What Really Triggered the Market's Crash on October 19, Wall St. J., Dec.
16, 1987, at 1, 20 (Proposed tax changes that would make takeovers much less attractive and a
wider than generally expected trade deficit triggered investor sell orders. A number of internal
stresses within the financial markets allowed an early sell off to rage out of control.); Specula-
tive Fever Ran High in the 10 Months Prior to Black Monday, Wall St. J., Dec. I1, 1987, at
1, 14 (A number of "esoteric ideas," including the adoption of "breakup value" as a standard
for company valuation, a surge in takeovers and leveraged buyouts, a "liquidity surge" and
overutilizations of the options and futures markets, triggered a speculative fever that led to
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More importantly, Berle and Means postulated in 1932, and re-
affirmed in 1967, that the nature of the corporate social contract in
modern society changed drastically and, most importantly, changed
voluntarily. Accordingly, corporate law had to be restructured to
take into account these changes.54 In other words, the corporate so-
cial contract had to be renegotiated.
In fact, the author believes that the legal system has already
conducted such a renegotiation, severely eroding the power of share-
holders to control corporate affairs. For example, most states
amended their corporation statutes to significantly restrict the pow-
ers of shareholders and expand those of management, including the
power to, under certain circumstances, issue corporate shares, and
designate powers, rights, and preferences without shareholder inter-
vention.5" The courts also interpreted directors' duties of care and
loyalty in an extremely deferential fashion, refusing to intervene in
board actions unless entered into in bad faith or without a rational
business purpose."
vastly overvalued stocks.).
54. BERLE & MEANS, supra note I, at 309-13.
55. See, e.g., Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151(a), (g)
(1983 & Supp. 1988) (Permits the board of directors of a corporation to issue "blank check"
stock (the issue of which has been previously authorized in its articles of incorporation) with
powers, designations, rights, and attributes designated thereby without shareholder
intervention.).
56. See, e.g., McCord, supra note 13, at 422-25; Baysinger & Butler, supra note 23, at
1262-67.
Moreover, in recent times, claims that a corporation's board of directors violated their
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders arose mainly in the
context of hostile takeovers. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265-66
(2d Cir. 1984) (defense tactic challenged as breach of duties of care and loyalty); Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 285 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981)
(shareholders have legal remedy if directors breach their fiduciary duty during defense of
tender offer); Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 374 (2d Cir. 1980)
(defensive tactic challenged by shareholders as breach of fiduciary duty during defense of
tender offer); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Associates, 600 F. Supp. 678, 681 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (sub-
stantial shareholder alleged board of directors breached fiduciary duty to corporation and
shareholders by entering into standstill agreement that restricted substantial shareholder's
ability to purchase corporation's stock); EAC Indus. v. Frantz Mfg. Corp., No. 85-8003, slip
op. at 23 (Del. Ch. June 28, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, De file) (director's participation in
block purchases challenged as breach of fiduciary duty); Edelman v. Phillips Petroleum Corp.,
No. 85-7899, slip. op. at 35 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, De file) (plaintiff
alleged board adopted recapitalization agreement with improper motive and in grossly negli-
gent manner); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769, 773
(1967); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964). In these situations,
courts in Delaware and other jurisdictions analyzed such claims under the business judgment
rule, which provides that the courts will not disturb the decisions of the board without evidence
that the board acted in bad faith or without a rational business purpose. See, e.g., Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 285 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981)
(no evidence of self-dealing, fraud, overreaching, or other bad conduct sufficient to give rise to
inference that impermissible motives predominated). Accord Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace
Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying New York law, directors afforded wide lati-
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Indeed, the federal securities laws" present another example of
the renegotiation of the corporate contract. The securities statutes
provide that, as long as corporate management discloses truthfully
the material facts about a transaction, the corporation's securities
can be sold to the public regardless of the merits of the transaction.
The underlying principle behind this approach appears to be that, as
long as accurate information about a corporate entity is available for
the market to assimilate and to assign a value to the investment,
investors can make an informed investment decision.5 8 Thus, the le-
gal renegotiation of the corporate social contract, which was advo-
cated by Berle and Means, appears to have taken place.
The question of whether the corporate democracy model of cor-
porate governance set forth in traditional corporate theory is an ade-
quate or accurate method of governing the firm is beyond the scope
of this Article. Berle and Means, however, advocated the legal rene-
gotiation of the corporate social contract to take into account the
changing nature of the corporate entity. This renegotiation of the
corporate social contract is somewhat excessive because it fails to
take into account the nature of corporate entities that do not con-
form to Berle and Means' model. Berle and Means admitted that
their model describes and applies only to the large, publicly owned
megafirms, 59 and that the majority of corporations in the United
States are not megafirms, but small corporations with limited as-
sets.6 0 Indeed, the situation has not changed since the time of Berle
and Means.61 Thus, the renegotiated corporate social contract is ap-
plicable to only a small percentage of existing corporations. Unfortu-
nately, there is no corporate social contract for the remaining, over-
whelming majority of traditional infant or adolescent corporations.
tude in devising strategies to resist unfriendly advance); Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382-83 (2d Cir. 1980) (directors presumed to have acted properly and in
good faith); Enterra v. SGS Associates, 600 F. Supp. 678, 685-87 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (presump-
tion of business judgment rule does not apply when board acted fraudulently or in bad faith or
self-interest.).
57. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to bbbb (1982); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to i (1982).
58. See. e.g., II L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 785-86 (2d ed. 1961); D.L. RATNER,
SECURITIES REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL 30-35 (1981).
59. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 18.
60. Id. Berle and Means' thesis is, however, that the small percentage of megafirms,
with billions of dollars in assets, have dominated and continue to dominate the American econ-
omy. Id. at 18-46.
61.
In 1981, the number of active corporations was estimated to be 2,812,000.
Statistical Abstract of the United States 516 (1985). In terms of dollar assets,
the spectrum of corporate size in 1981 has been broken down in the table below:
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The inevitable process of development towards maturity simply does
Number of
Total Assets % Active Corporations %
Assets Billions Distribution (thousand) Distribution
under $ 50 .6 1,570 55.8
$100,000
$100,000- $ 322 3.8 1,004 35.7
$1 mil.
$1 mil.- $ 526 6.2 201.1 7.1
$10 mil.
$10 $ 275 3.2 17.5 .6
mil.-$25
mil.
$25 $ 296 3.5 8.4 .3
mil.-$50
mil.








$250 $6165 72.1 3.1
mil. and
over
As the table illustrates, over 90 percent of U.S. corporations had assets of
under one million dollars, or, stated another way, the proportion of corporate
millionaires to the total number of corporation was less than one in ten. Break-
ing this down even further, the biggest block of corporations have assets between
$10,000 and $1,000,000, and the median corporation has assets of slightly under
$100,000. A. Conard, Corporations in Perspective 100, 101 (1976). Thus it
would appear that in terms of size, corporations are spread along an unbroken
spectrum, with the greatest concentration in numbers at the lower end.
It is also apparent from the table that, although corporations with assets of
over ten million dollars constitute about 1.3 percent of the total number of cor-
porations, they also control 89 percent of the total corporate assets.
Another important consideration is the number of investors. Although there
is less information with regard to investors than to other aspects of corporate
size, the available data on shareholders appear to fit the general pattern of cor-
porate statistics. In 1984, Exxon, which ranked first in sales ($90.9 billion), had
about 832,600 shareholders; General Motors, ranked second ($83.9 billion) had
957,000 shareholders. But over 90 percent of the total corporations have ten or
fewer shareholders, 1 percent have more than one hundred, and fewer than one
hundred corporations have more than one hundred thousand. Conard, supra at
119.
In summary, it is evident that since the greatest concentration of numbers is
found in corporations with assets between $10,000 and $1,000,000 and with less
than ten shareholders, if there were such a thing as the typical American corpo-
ration it certainly would not be the corporate giant. While an emphasis on the
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not appear to have occurred for most American corporations. More-
over, Berle and Means did not question the applicability and appro-
priateness of traditional corporate theory, and of the legal rules of
traditional corporate law, to the infant or adolescent corporation.
Additionally, a partial solution appears to have evolved in an-
swer to the problem of separation of ownership and control in mod-
ern megafirms described by Berle and Means: the large institutional
investor. Berle and Means admitted that these institutions, including
insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension plans, control large
blocks of shares of most major corporations. 2 Indeed, these institu-
tional investors hold either the majority, or a substantial minority, of
the shares of most megafirms,"3 rendering them capable of exercising
substantial influence, if not actual control, over these firms. Berle
and Means and other writers dismissed this phenomenon by noting
that, since institutional investors are only interested in maximizing
return on investment, these investors will either support management
or sell their investment. 4 There is some evidence, however, that in-
stitutional investors are willing to become active,6 5 will not support
management unconditionally, and, on occasion, will oppose manage-
multibillion-dollar enterprise is doubtless valuable to the macroeconomist as an
indicator of U.S production, for the lawyer to have the same focus is misleading.
For in the development of a body of corporate law appropriate to govern such
diverse entities, it is important that rules of law be considered in light of their
applicability to corporations of widely different dimensions.
SOLOMON, SCHWARTZ & BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 7-8 (2d ed. 1988).
62. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at xx. Accord CLARK, supra note 31, at 94-95 n.1;
EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 53-56 (1976).
63. EISENBERG, supra note 62, at 53-57.
64. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 244-52; Easterbrook & Fischel-Voting, supra
note 15, at 425-26. Indeed, Berle and Means utilized the institutional investor as another ex-
ample of the dilution of individual control of corporate entities. Id. There is, however, some
evidence that, as institutional investors acquire even larger amounts of corporate shares, they
come under increasing pressure to maximize performance by cultivating their existing invest-
ments rather than switching into new ones, because of the difficulty in liquidating enormous
dollar holdings, and because equally attractive alternative investments may not be readily
available. EISENBERG, supra note 62, at 61.
65. Id. Indeed, Professor Ryan notes that:
More importantly their [institutional investors'] role as the dominant equity
holders adds an interesting fillip to the now-orthodox Berle and Means observa-
tion about the management controlled corporation: although the control groups
in many public corporations are still able to perpetuate themselves without own-
ing a majority of the outstanding shares, the institutional investor is a much
greater potential threat to or problem for management because of the size of
institutional holdings and because of their sophistication as working investment
professionals.
Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L.
REV. 97, 149 (1988).
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ment." Indeed, the California Public Employees Retirement System
(PERS), the nation's largest public pension fund (with $46.8 billion
in assets), and the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association and
College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA/CREF), among others,
have recently submitted a number of shareholder resolutions to be
considered at the upcoming annual meetings of companies as diverse
as Avon Products, Inc., International Paper Company, and Lockheed
Corporation. 7 These resolutions oppose antitakeover charter provi-
sions and seek to prevent management from keeping records on how
shares are voted.68 In another dispute, PERS is seeking to have the
management of Texaco, Inc. create a special committee to ensure
that managers and directors consider shareholder views and con-
cerns."9 In other words, institutional investors have begun to assert
their power as substantial shareholders of corporate entities and are
beginning to acquire substantial influence over corporate manage-
ment. Thus, Berle and Means' model of an omnipotent management
and powerless shareholders may no longer be completely applicable
to the megafirms that were studied.
Moreover, another solution to the problem of the separation of
ownership and control described by Berle and Means may be emerg-
ing in the modern megafirm. Indeed, through the increasingly com-
mon technique of the management buyout,7 ° it appears that the sep-
66. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 62, at 57-63, 65 n.l. Moreover, during recent SEC
hearings on the advisability of adopting a rule dealing with shareholder voting rights, a signifi-
cant number of institutional investors strongly argued against any rule that would allow man-
agement to dilute shareholder voting rights. Ryan, supra note 65, at 147-51. See also Voting
Rights Listing Standards-Disenfranchisement Rule, Release No. 34-25891, 20 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1124, 1126-30 (July 15, 1988). See also New York Pension Funds to
Meet Exxon About Alaska Spill and Their Holdings, Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 1989, at A7A
(New York City pension funds, upset about Exxon's handling of oil spill, demand changes in
corporate policy); Pension Funds Plot Against Takeover Law, Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 1989, at C1
(three large pension funds to ask several large corporations to drop the protective umbrella of
Delaware's antitakeover law). This behavior is arguably inconsistent with assertions of institu-
tional investor passivity.
67. Ryan, supra note 65, at 157-60. See California's New Crusader for Shareholder
Rights, Bus. WK., Jan. 30, 1989, at 72.
68. Ryan, supra note 65, at 157-60. See California's New Crusader for Shareholder
Rights, Bus. WK., Jan. 30, 1989, at 72.
69. Ryan, supra note 65, at 157-60. See California's New Crusader for Shareholder
Rights, Bus. WK., Jan. 30, 1989, at 72.
70. A management buyout is a leveraged buyout effected by a company's management.
A leveraged buyout typically involves four distinct transactions: (1) the formation of a new
company to acquire all the assets or shares of an existing operating company or to acquire the
assets of an operating division of a multi-division company; (2) the cash purchase of those
assets or shares and a distribution to public shareholders of cash or a combination of cash and
senior securities; (3) loans to the new company from banks and other institutional lenders to
furnish the cash; (4) the distribution of the new company's equity to members of its manage-
ment or to its various lenders. DeMott, Directors' Duties in Management Buyouts and Lever-
aged Recapitalizations, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 519 (1988). See also Oesterle & Norberg,
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aration of control and ownership is giving way to a unification of
these attributes in the same group of individuals. If, as Berle and
Means speculated, ownership of a corporate entity became a rather
insignificant attribute and control alone conferred relatively risk-free
wealth, power, and status to the entity's managers, why, then, is the
management buyout phenomenon becoming so pervasive?71
III. The Current Takeover Feeding Frenzy: A Culmination of
Berle and Means?
One of the most controversial phenomena in modern business
history is the recent proliferation of hostile corporate takeovers,
mergers, and acquisitions.72 The increase in takeover attempts has
engendered the development of a rash of defensive tactics through
which the management of potential target corporations have at-
tempted to protect themselves.7"
These tactics have been divided by a commentator into tech-
niques for use prior to the making of a hostile takeover offer (shark
repellents) and techniques for use after a hostile offer is made (de-
fensive techniques). 4 Shark repellents include requiring super
majority approval for the removal of a director or for changes in the
corporation's form, bylaws, and articles of incorporation;" creating
lock-up amendments that require a higher vote to amend
supermajority voting provisions once adopted; 6 providing senior
management with golden parachute employment contracts;77 and
Management Buyouts, Creating or Appropriating Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV.
207 (1988).
71. In 1986, 4,024 merger and acquisition transactions, with a value of $190,512.3 mil-
lion, were completed. Over one fifth of these transactions were leveraged buyouts. By June of
1987, completed buyouts for the year totaled $34.3 billion. DeMott, supra note 70, at 517.
72. See supra notes 11, 13 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Block & Miller, supra note 13, at 44 (increase in hostile takeover activity
resulted in novel and innovative defense tactics). See also McCord, supra note 13, at 417-22
(limitation of defensive techniques is justified on grounds of economic efficiency and limiting
conflicts between interests of management and shareholders).
74. Baysinger & Butler, supra note 23, at 1267.
75. See Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limits on
the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775, 780-83 (1982) (purpose of provisions is to im-
pede transfer of control of board of directors).
76. Baysinger & Butler, supra note 23, at 1268.
77. A golden parachute employment contract is a special termination agreement that
shelters executives from the effects of a corporate takeover by providing executives who are
dismissed, or who resign as a result of a change in the control of a corporation, with either
continued compensation for a certain period of time or a lump sum payment. Note, Golden
Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule: Toward a Proper Standard of Review, 94 YALE
L. 909, 909-12 (1985) (golden parachutes are becoming commonplace); see also Note,
Golden Parachute Agreements: Cushioning Executive Bailouts in the Wake of a Tender Offer,
57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 516, 516-18 (golden parachutes insulate management and are unfair to
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making the corporation unpalatable by providing it with a poison
pill.78 Defensive techniques include: paying greenmail to an un-
wanted bidder;7 9 selling the corporation's crown jewels; 80 merging
with a white knight;8' engaging in the pac man defense;82 and, the
ultimate defense, the Jonestown defense.8" Indeed, the range of de-
fenses that management can create to fend off unwanted takeover
attempts seems to be limited only by the imagination and creativity
of corporate counsel.
Courts have generally reacted to these hostile takeover attempts
and the defenses thereto in the context of allegations that the target
corporation's board of directors violated their fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty to the corporation.8' The courts applied the business
judgment rule, which provides that decisions of a corporation's board
of directors will not be disturbed in the absence of evidence that the
board acted in bad faith or without a rational business purpose.85
This determination involves a factual analysis that varies considera-
bly from case to case. 8 Indeed, courts found the use of the same
the corporation).
78. A poison pill is a dividend distributed by a corporation to its shareholders in the
form of convertible securities or warrants. In the event of a takeover attempt, the dividend can
be converted into common stock held by the bidder, thus presenting a would-be bidder with the
prospect of a severe dilution of his earnings if the tender offer is successful. Greene &
Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 647, 705 (1984).
79. A company targeted for takeover can pay greenmail to an unwanted corporate suitor
and settle the raider's tender offer by purchasing all of the stock of the target company bought
by the raider in the open market at a significant premium over its market price. The end result
of this transaction is a significant profit to the raider. Id. at 705.
80. A target company can sell its crown jewels by selling to a friendly suitor one of the
company's subsidiaries that is particularly attractive to the raider, enabling the friendly suitor
to make a friendly merger proposition or tender offer that the target company will favor. Id. at
701. See. e.g., MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch.
1985), a-f'd, 505 A.2d 454 (Del. 1985).
81. A white knight, a company that maintains a friendly relationship with the target
company, has been persuaded by the target company's management to make a competing
tender offer in order to defeat the hostile raider's tender offer. Reiser, Corporate Takeovers: A
Glossary of Terms and Tactics, 89 CASE & COM. 35, 51 (1984).
82. A target company engages in the pac man defense by launching an equally hostile
tender offer for the stock of the raider. If each company succeeds in buying control of the
other, both companies will be effectively paralyzed. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 78, at 702.
The classic example of the pac man defense is the Bendix-Marietta takeover battle. See Mar-
tin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 627-28 (D. Md. 1982) (attempt by
Martin Marietta to prevent takeover by Bendix). See also H. LAMPERT, TILL DEATH Do Us
PART 53 (1983) ("Mexican Standoff" could result if each company buys control of the other.).
83. The target company uses the Jonestown defense, also known as the scorched earth
defense, when it decides to liquidate itself, either in whole or part. Greene & Junewicz, supra
note 78, at 701; Reiser, supra note 81, at 44.
84. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
85. Id.
86. This factual analysis, which is identical to a court's analysis of whether the actions
of a board of directors are the product of an informed business judgment, can be quite exten-
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defensive technique in two different takeover situations to be permis-
sible in one case and impermissible in the other.87
The legislative response to the increase in hostile takeover at-
tempts has consisted primarily of the adoption by various states of
legislation that makes a successful hostile takeover attempt ex-
tremely difficult or almost impossible.8 Indeed, in CTS Corporation
v. Dynamics Corporation of America,89 the United States Supreme
Court held that one such statute enacted by Indiana9 ° was justified
by the state's interests in defining attributes of corporate shares and
in protecting shareholders. Thus, the statute did not violate the com-
merce clause of the federal constitution. 91
The increase in hostile takeover activity may be related to Berle
and Means' thesis. If, as Berle and Means believed, a corporate
shareholder is merely an investor and not an owner of a corpora-
tion,92 then hostile takeover activity, at least from the point of view
of the hostile bidder, is merely a means of making an investment
that results in the highest return in the shortest possible time. This
purpose is achieved by buying an asset (control of a corporate entity)
that either can be sold at a higher price or dismantled and liquidated
for a profit. Indeed, from the perspective of Berle and Means, a pur-
chaser of control is the owner.
Corporate managers would then view the corporation as a sta-
sive and complex. For example, in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), the
Delaware Supreme Court, in attempting to ascertain whether approval by the board of direc-
tors of a friendly cash-out merger with another company was the product of the board's in-
formed business judgment, carefully examined all the actions of management and the board of
directors in minute detail. Id. at 864-70. The Smith court held that the merger was not the
product of the board's informed business judgment because the board was grossly negligent in
evaluating the merger proposal before it. Id. at 884.
87. Compare Condec v. Lunkenheimer, 43 Del. Ch. 353, 357, 230 A.2d 769, 776-77
(1967) (issuance of stock to white knight for improper purpose of retaining control invalid and
not protected by the business judgment rule) with Treadway Companies v. Care Corp., 638
F.2d 357, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1980) (issuance of stock to white knight for the purpose of protect-
ing the corporation from attack by a hostile bidder proper and protected by the business judg-
ment rule).
88. See IND. CODE §§ 23-1-17-1 to 17-5 (Supp. 1986) (held not to violate the federal
constitution in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); see infra notes
89-91 and accompanying text; 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1611 (Purdon Supp. 1989); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988) (held not to violate the commerce clause of the federal consti-
tution and not to constitute an impermissible delegation of authority in City Capital Associates
v. Interco, Inc., No. 88-424-JJF (U.S.D.C. D. Del. Sept. 23, 1988).
89. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
90. The statute, IND. CODE § 23-1-17-1 to 17-5 (Supp. 1986), provided that any entity
that acquired "control shares" (as defined therein) in a corporation subject thereto acquired
the voting rights attached to such shares only to the extent granted by resolution of the major-
ity of the shareholders of the corporation. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S.
69, 73 (1987).
91. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 87-94.
92. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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ble, productive member of society with a distinct legal personality
and interests that may differ from those of the shareholders and that
should, of course, be protected.93 Hostile takeover activity, therefore,
is undesirable because it can disrupt the corporation's normal pro-
ductive activity, can result in the corporation's dismemberment, and
can have a negative impact on the nation's economy.94 Indeed, cor-
porate managers would be quick to assert that hostile bidders, whose
sole interest is a quick profit at the expense of the corporate entity,
clearly do not engage in a desirable activity.96 Thus, corporate man-
agement should have the encouragement of the legal system and the
ability to create defensive techniques to protect the corporation from
hostile takeovers.96 Indeed, the legislature and judiciary have tended
to view hostile takeover activity as disruptive of the stability of cor-
porate entities and support defensive techniques to protect these enti-
ties from the depredations of corporate takeover artists.9"
By contrast, those who do not accept Berle and Means' thesis of
the shareholder as a passive rentier and who think of the shareholder
as an essential part of the corporate entity would emphasize the role
of the shareholder in hostile takeover situations. Since the sharehold-
ers are the true owners of the corporate entity, the purpose of a cor-
poration, and of corporate law, should be to maximize shareholder
welfare and benefits." In other words, the good of the enterprise, as
viewed by corporate shareholders, is the functional equivalent of the
good of the shareholders. Thus, management would not be an impor-
tant party in takeover activity because managers are mere agents for
the corporation's true owners, the shareholders.9 9 From this point of
view, hostile takeover activity is desirable and should be encouraged
because it stimulates corporate management to greater efficiency,
which results in increased profits and maximized shareholder wel-
fare.100 Furthermore, hostile takeovers allow shareholders to choose
between competing parties seeking to purchase the shareholder's in-
vestment. This competition ensures that the selling shareholders will
receive a better price for their shares, which enhances the share-
93. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 109-12
(1979).
94. Id. at 104-05.
95. Id. at 114.
96. Id. at 120-24, 130.
97. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
98. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HAv. L. REv. 1161, 1165-68 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fis-
chel-Proper Role].
99. Baysinger & Butler, supra note 23, at 1271.
100. Easterbrook & Fischel-Proper Role, supra note 98, at 1169-71.
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holder's welfare. 10 1 Accordingly, takeover defense mechanisms artifi-
cially interfere with a desirable process, and should be severely re-
stricted or prohibited entirely.'0 2 Indeed, this point of view has been
adopted in at least two congressional bills, both of which place re-
strictions on hostile tender offers. 0 3
The relationship between Berle and Means' theory and hostile
takeover activity becomes clearer upon examination of two takeover
defense techniques: the creation of supershares (a shark repellent),
and management's discrimination of shareholders when responding
to a hostile tender offer (a defensive technique).
IV. The Shareholder, the Corporation, and Pre-Offer Defense
Techniques: Dual Class Recapitalization
A new takeover defensive technique has achieved recent promi-
nence: the creation of two or more classes of shares with different
voting powers.104 This recapitalization typically results in a number
of insiders retaining control of a corporate entity without owning the
majority of its shares.1
0 5
There are several means of achieving insider control by corpo-
rate recapitalization. The recapitalization can consist of an arrange-
ment in which the same class of common stock has two different
voting powers and a cap is placed on the number of votes that each
share can cast in a shareholder vote. 10 The recapitalization can also
be arranged by having the voting power of a class of common or
preferred stock determined by the amount of time the shares are
held.07 In addition, the same class of stock can have different voting
rights dependent on the identity of the shareholder. 08 Another tech-
101. Id. at 1177-80.
102. Id. at 1164, 1174-80.
103. See, e.g., S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (extends the period of time that
tender offers would be required to be held open, prohibits the payment of greenmail, and
requires the registration of arbitrageurs); H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (also pro-
hibits the payment of greenmail and extends the period of time that tender offers must be held
open, and prohibits the acquisition of more than ten percent of the shares of a corporation
except by tender offer).
104. Seligman, supra note 15, at 687.
105. Id.
106. Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 n.2 (Del. 1977). In Provi-
dence & Worcester, the corporation's articles of incorporation provided that each stockholder
had one vote for every share of the common stock of the company that he owned, not to exceed
fifty votes. Such a shareholder also had one vote for every twenty shares, over fifty shares, that
he owned. No shareholder was entitled to vote more than one-fourth of the total number of
shares of common stock issued and outstanding. Id.
107. Kersten v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 647, 648 (N.D. Iowa 1985);
Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
108. Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. N.L. Industries, 664 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
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nique utilizes a dual set of common stock, one of which has the right
to cast a significantly higher number of votes and is non-transfera-
ble. 09 Finally, recapitalization can be achieved by creating a super-
preferred class of stock that is entitled to cast a large number of
votes on matters to be decided by common stock holders.'
The near-universal rule at the end of the nineteenth century was
that each share of common stock was entitled to one vote.111 Recapi-
talization arrangements represent a departure from this rule and
have generated a significant amount of controversy and
commentary." 2
The debate over the one-share one-vote rule"13 appears to have
crystallized into several distinct arguments. Some commentators be-
lieve that since shareholders are the owners of the corporation, the
shareholder vote is the leading method to control management. A
dilution of the one-share one-vote rule allows a minority to control
corporate affairs, rendering the majority of the shareholders power-
less." This situation leads to an entrenched, complacent manage-
ment and possesses great potential for abuse."'
Professors Berle and Means argued, however, that manage-
aft'd, 825 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1987); ASARCO Inc. v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 470-73 (D.N.J.
1985);
109. Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690, 693 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Lacos
Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 A.2d 271, 273-75 (Del. Ch. 1986); Societe Holding Ray
D'Albion S.A. v. Saunders Leasing Sys., Inc., No. 81-6648 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 1981) (LEXIS,
States library, De file).
110. Packer v. Yampol, No. 86-8432 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 1986) (LEXIS States library,
De file).
I ll. Ratner, supra note 2, at 8. The origin of the one-share one-vote rule is quite ob-
scure. Some commentators speculated that the rule was borrowed from political theory and
founded on a fear that corporations would become too powerful if not subjected to "democratic
type controls." Ratner, supra note 2, at 8-10; Kerbel, supra note 15, at 47-49. Other commen-
tators suggested that the one-share one-vote rule arose because of a logical function; it is easier
and cheaper to organize corporate elections if each share is given one vote. Easterbrook &
Fischel-Voting, supra note 15, at 408-09.
112. See, e.g., supra note 15 and accompanying text.
113. The debate concerns mainly the availability of one vote per share for common
shareholders. There does not seem to be any problem with restricting voting rights for pre-
ferred shareholders, who presumably are paying for their preferences with reduced voting
rights. But see Kersten v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Iowa 1985);
ASARCO Inc. v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985); Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Rich-
ardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (these cases involved the issuance of
preferred shares that were found to fundamentally alter the voting rights of common
shareholders).
114. Note, Dual Class Capitalization and Shareholder Voting Rights, 87 COLuM. L.
REV. 106, 112 (1987); Impact of Corporate Takeovers. Senate Hearing 99-187 before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. at 840, 1172-73
(1986) [hereinafter Hearings]. See also Easterbrook & Fischel-Voting, supra note 15, at 406-
09.
115. Hearings, supra note 114, at 840, 1172-73; Easterbrook & Fischel-Voting, supra
note 15, at 406-09; Release No. 25891, supra note 16, at 1126-28.
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ment's usurpation of control of the proxy machinery leads to an ir-
relevant shareholder vote. Shareholders have no desire or are power-
less to intervene in the management of the corporation. 1 '6 Other
commentators have argued that, since shareholders are merely inves-
tors in the corporate entity," shareholder voting is irrelevant. The
market's liquidity, the availability of the derivative action, and the
rules against management fraud are the only protection against
abuse to which a shareholder should be entitled." 8 Other commenta-
tors have asserted that since the one-share one-vote rule is clearly
political and a corporation does not resemble a political entity, 19 the
rules of democratic behavior should not be applicable to the
corporation.120
The market institutions' response to this debate gives credence
to the argument that the perception of shareholders as enfranchised
rentiers is politically unacceptable. The New York Stock Exchange
adopted a rule, which was briefly suspended, prohibiting the trading
on the Exchange of common stock that possesses the right to more or
less than one vote per share.12tThe American Stock Exchange cre-
ated a series of less stringent guidelines that allow listed companies'
stock bearing the right to more or less than one vote per share to be
traded in certain circumstances."' The North American Securities
116. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 76-82, 128-31.
117. Some commentators have argued that shareholders should be allowed to decide
whether they wish to give up their proportional voting powers to management. See, e.g., Dent,
supra note 15, at 733-35, 743-46.
118. See A. CHAYES, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORA-
TION AND MODERN SOCIETY, 38-45 (1959).
119. FISCHEL, supra note 15, at 2-3; Easterbrook & Fischel-Voting, supra note 15, at
396, 412.
120. FISCHEL, supra note 15, at 2-3; Easterbrook & Fischel-Voting, supra note 15, at
396, 412.
121. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 3 (1983), reprinted
in Hearings, supra note 114, at 1134-41.
122. The American Stock Exchange, in a policy statement known as the "Wang
formula" (derived from understandings with Wang Laboratories prior to the listing of its stock
for trading in 1976), indicated that it will allow the listing of limited vote common stock if
certain requirements are met:
The limited voting class of the common must have the ability - voting as a
class - to elect not less than 25% of the board of directors;
There may not be a voting ratio greater than 10 to I in favor of the "super"
voting class on all matters other than the election of directors;
No additional stock (whether designated as common or preferred) may be
created which can in any way diminish voting power granted to the holders of
the limited voting class. For example, should a listed company create a "blank
check" voting preferred, this issue would not be permitted to vote with the lim-
ited voting class, since to do so would diminish the limited voting issue's rights.
Instead, the preferred would have to vote with the "super" voting issue;
The Exchange will generally require that the "super" class lose certain of
its attributes should the number of such shares fall below a certain percentage of
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Administrators Association"'3 adopted a statement of policy declar-
ing that an issue of stock bearing less than one vote per share is
unfair, unless the shareholder has been given something in return for
the loss of the right to one vote per share. In addition, eighteen
states adopted regulations prohibiting the issuance of stock with une-
qual voting rights.12
A limited number of cases involving dual class recapitalization
have been decided by the courts.1 2 In Providence & Worcester Co.
v. Baker,"6 the Delaware Supreme Court held that a technique,
which actually enfranchised small shareholders by limiting the num-
ber of votes to be cast by large shareholders, was acceptable. 2 7 On
the other hand, limiting the number of votes based on the identity of
the shareholder' 28 or on the amount of time the shareholder has held
the stock'2 9 was held to be an unacceptable technique because it cre-
ated two different voting rights in the same class of stock. 130
At least three courts have approved the creation of dual class
stock based on an offering to all shareholders and approved by an
informed vote of all shareholders.' Conversely, a recapitalization
creating dual class stock that does not require approval by the corpo-
ration's shareholders is not acceptable.3 2 Furthermore, if share-
holder approval is the product of a coercive or uninformed vote, the
arrangement is unacceptable.'
Unfortunately, an analysis of the cases reveals that the courts'
holdings are limited. The courts have invalidated recapitalization ar-
the total capitalization.
While not specifically required, it is strongly recommended that a dividend
preference be established for the limited voting issue.
Seligman, supra note 15, at 704 n.90.
123. The North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) is an organ-
ization of state and provincial officials enforcing state blue sky laws pertaining to the sales of
securities. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS 322 (22d ed. 1988).
124. Seligman, supra note 15, at 713 & n.113.
125. See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text.
126. 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977).
127. Id. at 122-24.
128. ASARCO Inc. v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 476-78 (D.N.J. 1985).
129. Kersten v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 647, 647-49 (N.D. Iowa 1985);
Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407, 408-10 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
130. See supra notes 107-08, 128-29 and accompanying text.
131. Packer v. Yampol, No. 86-8432, slip op. at 31-40 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 1986)
(LEXIS, States library, De file); Societe Holding Ray D'Albion S.A. v. Saunders Leasing
Sys., Inc., No. 81-6648, slip op. at 4-6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 1981) (LEXIS, States library, De
file); Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp. 690, 696-98 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
132. American Pacific Corp. v. Super Food Servs., Inc., No. 82-7020, slip op. at 8-13
(Del. Ch. Dec. 6, 1982) (LEXIS, States library, De file); Telvest, Inc. v. Olson, No. 79-5798,
slip op. at 9-16 (Del. Ch. March 8, 1979) (LEXIS, States library, De file).
133. Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 A.2d 271 (Del. Ch. 1986).
94 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1989
rangements that created two different voting powers within the same
class of stock."" The courts have also invalidated any recapitaliza-
tions involving rearrangements of shareholder voting rights that were
not approved by an informed and free shareholder vote. 3 ' These
cases, however, did not decide the question of whether or not all
common stock should have the right to one vote per share or whether
dual class recapitalization plans are per se impermissible. Further-
more, a review of the case law reveals that courts are reluctant to
invalidate any recapitalization that has been approved by an in-
formed vote of the shareholders."'6
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has attempted
to resolve the debate by another method. In a recent release,"3 7 the
SEC adopted a new rule1 38 under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 a9 that addresses voting rights in shares traded on the public
market. The SEC, concerned with the proliferation of commentaries
regarding the one-share one-vote rule, conducted a study and held a
number of hearings on the issue.' 40 The SEC stated that the new




The new SEC rule forbids an exchange or association from list-
ing for trade or trading any common stock or any other equity secur-
ity of a domestic issuer, if the issuer of the security issues any class
of security or takes any other corporate action that has the effect of
nullifying, restricting, or disparately reducing the per share voting
rights of holders of an outstanding class or classes of common stock
registered in accordance with the Securities Exchange Act of
134. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 131, 133 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 127, 131 and accompanying text. The courts seem to agree with
Professor Dent's argument that shareholders are capable of and should be allowed to decide
whether they wish to give up their proportional voting powers to management. See supra note
119 and accompanying text. This does not take into account, however, Professors Berle and
Means' assertion that shareholders have no control over the voting process. See supra note 118
and accompanying text. On the other hand, the courts appear to be highly reluctant to validate
a dual stock recapitalization that appears to be an egregious, outright or involuntary disen-
franchisement of common shareholders. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
137. Release No. 25891, supra note 16.
138. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4).
139. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
140. Release No. 25891, supra note 16, at 1124-26. It is interesting to note that at these
hearings, a number of commentators questioned the SEC's authority to adopt a rule imposing
substantive corporate law standards on exchange listed companies. Id. at 1128. Indeed, the
SEC found it necessary to include in the Release promulgating the new rule an extensive
discussion in support of its authority to engage in rulemaking in this area. Id. at 1142-46.
141. Release No. 25891, supra note 16.
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1934.142 This restricting action is known as the forbidden effect. 14 3
The new rule also states that corporate action imposing any re-
striction on the voting power of shares of the issuer's common stock
held by a beneficial holder of record shall be presumed to have the
forbidden effect, which prevents the listing of the issuer's securities,
if the action is based on the number of shares held by such beneficial
or record holder.1" ' A similar presumption attaches to the imposition
of any restriction on the voting power of shares of the issuer's com-
mon stock held by a record holder if the restriction is based on the
length of time the shares were held by the beneficial or record
holder.1 5 Furthermore, any issuance of securities through an ex-
change offer by the issuer for shares of an outstanding class of the
issuer's common stock shall be presumed to have the forbidden effect
if the securities issued have voting rights greater than or less than
the per share voting rights of any outstanding class of the issuer's
common stock."46 Last, a stock dividend, or any other type of distri-
bution of stock in which the securities issued have voting rights
greater than the per share voting rights of any outstanding class of
the issuer's common stock, shall also be presumed to have the forbid-
den effect and shall be banned from listing or trading.""
The new rule specifically provides, however, that the mere issu-
ance of securities pursuant to an initial registered public offering
shall not be presumed to have the forbidden effect."" A registered
public offering that results in the issuance of any class of securities
with voting rights not greater than the per share voting rights of any
outstanding class of the issuer's common stock shall also not be pre-
sumed to have the forbidden effect." 9 Moreover, the issuance of any
class of securities to implement a bona fide merger or acquisition,
with voting rights not greater than the per share voting rights of any
outstanding class of the common stock of the issuer, standing alone,
shall also benefit from the presumption of validity.5 0 Last, standing
alone, corporate action taken pursuant to state law requiring a
142. Release No. 25891, supra note 16, at 1147 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-
4(a)).
143. Id.
144. Release No. 25891, supra note 16, at 1147 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-
4(c)(1)).
145. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(c)(2)).
146. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(c)(3)).
147. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(c)(4)).
148. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(d)(1)).
149. Release 25891, supra note 16, at 1147 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-
4(d)(2)).
150. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(d)(3)).
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state's domestic corporation to condition the voting rights of a bene-
ficial or record holder of a specified threshold percentage of the cor-
poration's voting stock on approval of the corporation's independent
shareholders shall also be presumed to be valid. 5 '
The SEC took a middle-of-the-road position in the one-share
one-vote debate. The SEC has reaffirmed the principle that the
shareholders' right to vote is important and not irrelevant.' 52 The
SEC does not accept shareholder disenfranchisement.' 53 Moreover,
the new rule reflects the SEC's recognition that there is a real dan-
ger of shareholder disenfranchisement if corporations are allowed to
dilute shareholder voting rights without limitation. 4
The SEC chose to prohibit transactions that create two different
voting rights for the same class of stock or change the shareholder
compact relative to the voting rights of stock classes by creating a
superpowerful voting stock.' 55 The SEC hesitated, however, to forbid
all dual stock recapitalizations because there may be valid reasons
for creating disparate stock voting rights in certain situations. 5 The
SEC also expressly approved corporate action taken pursuant to
state statutes that impose requirements designed to retard or prevent
hostile corporate takeovers. 5
What, then, is the tentative result of this debate? Clearly, the
proliferation of dual class recapitalization plans is rooted in the per-
ception that hostile takeover attempts are undesirable because they
threaten the stability of a corporate entity's management.' 58 The au-
thor believes that management's wholesale embrace of dual class re-
capitalization is an extrapolation of the Berle and Means' thesis re-
lating to the shareholder vote. In essence, it is acceptable for a
corporation's management to defend against hostile takeovers by di-
luting the vote of the majority of the shareholders because, as Berle
and Means demonstrated, most shareholders have no desire to have,
and do not use, their right to vote, thereby rendering the shareholder
vote irrelevant. 59
The author, however, believes that this analysis is not sup-
151. Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(d)(4)). The new rule has a grand
fathering provision that precludes its application to dual class recapitalization plans that were
proposed or adopted prior to July 7, 1988. Release No. 25891, supra note 16, at 1136-37.
152. Release No. 25891, supra note 16, at 1130-32.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1135-37.
156. Id. at 1133-35.
157. Release No. 25891, supra note 16, at 1138-40.
158. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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ported by the evidence. Contrary to Berle and Means' predictions,
shareholder voting is not obsolete, but is thriving. 6 °For example, it
is common practice to have a shareholder vote on a number of mat-
ters that are not required to be submitted to a vote by state corpo-
rate law, including matters related to hostile takeovers. 6' Indeed,
takeovers could be viewed as situations in which the effectiveness of
the shareholder vote is validated. Perhaps Berle and Means prema-
turely chronicled the passing of the traditional concerned, activist
individual shareholder. There is some evidence that the institutional
shareholder, who owns significant amounts of the stock of major cor-
porations, is assuming the traditional role of activist and concerned
shareholder, and is becoming a significant influence in the modern
corporate equation." 2 The right to control the election of manage-
ment through substantial shareholdings enables the institutional in-
vestor to become a significant check and balance against an omnipo-
tent management.
Commentators note that voting is not only relevant but also im-
portant. First, voting is a mechanism within the contractual relation-
ship of a corporation whereby all decisions not covered by law are
made."' Since shareholders are the residual claimants to the corpo-
ration's income and assets, shareholders have the incentive to make
these decisions.'4 Furthermore, voting is an important way of polic-
ing management and holding management accountable.165 Even if
voting is seldom, if ever, used to oust management, the mere exis-
tence of the power serves as a deterrent to omnipotent manage-
ment. '6 Moreover, if the relationship between the shareholder and
the corporation is contractual, the right to vote is the consideration
for the common shareholder's contract with the corporation.' 67 The
only absolute right or attribute that a shareholder receives in consid-
eration for advancing funds to the corporation and becoming its
shareholder is the right, exercisable through the vote, to choose the
corporation's management and to be consulted on fundamental
changes in the corporate entity. Voting is important to management
160. Easterbrook & Fischel-Voting, supra note 15, at 406-07.
161. Id. at 417-18.
162. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
163. Easterbrook & Fischel-Voting, supra note 15, at 403.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 412.
166. Id.
167. Berle and Means dedicated a substantial part of their treatise to a description and
discussion of how the traditional protections that corporate law gave to shareholders were
gradually eliminated. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 119-40.
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because the voting mechanism is the key to control of the corporate
entity in the present system of corporate law.
Although there may be valid business reasons for dual class re-
capitalization,16 the technique can be destructive when used to
restructure the contract between the common shareholders and the
corporation by leaving the shareholders powerless to affect any cor-
porate decisions. Some commentators note that shareholders can and
should have the ability to give up voting rights if so desired.16 9 The
possibility cannot be ignored, however, that an extremely powerful
management can coerce a shareholder's decision. The SEC model
took a sensible middle-of-the-road approach to this issue in order to
resolve the one-share one-vote controversy. State legislatures should
adopt the SEC's approach of forbidding transactions that have the
effect of either creating two different voting rights for the same stock
or changing the shareholder compact relative to the voting rights of
classes of stock by creating a superpowerful voting stock.
V. The Shareholder, the Corporation, and Post-Offer Defensive
Techniques: Discriminating Against the Raider-Shareholder
A second takeover defensive technique that achieved recent
prominence is the conscious and direct discrimination by the corpo-
ration against a shareholder who is viewed as having interests inimi-
cal to those of the corporation. The discriminatory self tender uti-
lized in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.' exemplifies this
defensive technique. In Unocal, Mesa, the owner of fourteen percent
of Unocal's common stock, commenced a two tier, front-end-loaded
tender offer17 1 for thirty-seven percent of Unocal's stock at a price of
$54.00 per share payable in cash. The second tier of the offer was to
acquire the remainder of Unocal's publicly held shares through an
exchange of securities purportedly worth $54.00 per share.172 Uno-
168. For example, estate planning and to enable foreign investors to invest in sensitive
industries in which foreign majority ownership is either prohibited or restricted. See Kerbel,
supra note 15, at 46.
169. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 15, at 733-35; Release No. 25891, supra note 16, at
1131. See also supra note 131 and accompanying text. One question that arises in this context
is why shareholders would voluntarily choose to give up their voting rights, since, as discussed
above, they seem to be extremely important.
170. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
171. A "two tier, front-end-loaded tender offer" is a takeover device by which a gener-
ous cash amount is offered for a controlling stake in the target company and thereafter a plan
is announced for following up this offer with a second-step merger at a lower price per share
payable in cash and securities. Mirvis, Two-Tier Pricing: Some Appraisal and Entire Fairness
Valuation Issues, 38 Bus. LAw. 485 (1983); Reiser, Corporate Takeovers: A Glossary of
Terms and Tactics, 89 CASE & CoM. 35, 40 (1984).
172. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985).
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cal's board of directors rejected the offer as grossly inadequate. 173
Unocal's board of directors met one week later and decided, as
a defense against Mesa's offer, to initiate a self tender 174 for its own
stock at a price of between $70.00 and $80.00 a share. 1 5 The shares
of Unocal owned by Mesa were excluded from Unocal's self tender
offer. 76 However, Unocal's directors were encouraged to tender their
shares in response to the self tender. 177 Mesa, claiming that Unocal's
selective exchange offer was legally impermissible, commenced liti-
gation against Unocal. 78
The Delaware Chancery Court, citing Fisher v. Moltz, 79 de-
cided that even if Unocal had a proper purpose for initiating the self
tender, and the self tender did not unduly favor one group over an-
other, Unocal had the burden of showing that the self tender was
fair to all Unocal shareholders. 8 ' Finding that Unocal had not met
the burden, the court issued a temporary restraining order barring
Unocal from continuing the self tender while excluding Mesa.' 8 '
In a second opinion ruling on Mesa's motion for a preliminary
injunction, 182 the Delaware Chancery Court stated that the basic is-
sue in the case was the question of whether corporate directors owed
fiduciary duties to shareholders who they perceived to be acting con-
trary to the best interests of the corporation as a whole.8 3 Unocal
argued, in effect, that a director's fiduciary duty to treat all share-
holders fairly should be suspended for any shareholder perceived to
be a threat to the company. 84 The court disagreed with Unocal, held
173. Id. at 950.
174. A self tender offer is a defense device "... by which the incumbent management
can oppose a hostile takeover attempt by purchasing the company's shares on the market,
thereby precluding acquisition of those shares by the control seeking group or company."
Note, Corporate Law-Corporations May Exclude Raiders from Defensive Self-Tender Offers
in Warding Off Hostile Takeovers-Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985), 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 301 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Corporate Law].
175. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950-51.
176. Id. at 951.
177. Id.
178. 493 A.2d at 949.
179. No. 79-6068 (Del. Ch. Dec. 28, 1979), cited in 5 DEL. J. CORP. L. 530 (1980). In
Fisher, a corporation offered to purchase all of its shares of stock from certain former employ-
ees but not from others. The Delaware Chancery Court held that, in these situations, a burden
was imposed upon the corporation to show that there is a valid corporate purpose for limiting
the offer and in doing so it has not unduly favored one group over another. The court held the
corporate defendant had not met this burden. 5 DEL. J. CoRP. L. at 531-32.
180. Mesa Petroleum v. Unocal Corp., No. 85-7997, slip op. at 6-7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29,
1985) (LEXIS, States library, De file).
181. Id. at 8-9.
182. Mesa Petroleum v. Unocal Corp., No. 85-7997, slip op. at 6-7 (Del. Ch. May 13,
1985) (LEXIS, States library, De file).
183. Id. at 14.
184. Id. at 18.
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that the business judgment rule did not apply to the transaction,' 85
and issued a preliminary injunction barring Unocal from continuing
the self tender.'86
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, 187 noting that the busi-
ness judgment rule is applicable in takeover situations. However, the
court held that before the business judgment rule applied, it must be
shown that the directors had reasonable grounds to believe, based on
good faith and reasonable investigation, that a danger to the corpo-
ration existed because of the raider's stock ownership.' 88 The court
then examined the facts surrounding Unocal's self tender and found
that such reasonable grounds existed, and that the self tender was a
reasonable response to the threat posed to the corporation. 89 The
court then held that Unocal's self tender was entitled to the protec-
tion of the business judgment rule, 190 reversed the Chancery Court
185. The court, in response to Unocal's argument, noted that: "Although shareholders
may, at times, be treated differently consistent with the director's fiduciary duties . . . there
appear to be no cases approving an abdication of those duties." Id. (citation omitted). Further-
more, the court continued:
Any suspension of fiduciary duties as to a raider is all the more suspect because,
under the standards governing defensive maneuvers, the target's directors need
not establish that the raider would harm the company, they only must show a
good faith belief. Mesa has a $1 billion investment in Unocal and is its largest
shareholder. Good faith beliefs are not sufficient justification to discriminate
against such a shareholder.
Id. at 18-19. The court went on to hold that:
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the exchange offers' exclusion of Mesa
cannot be justified as a defensive maneuver without departing from the estab-
lished principles of fiduciary duty governing directors' treatment of their share-
holders . . . . [Tihe business judgment rule does not apply to selective tender
offers. Moreover, even if Fisher were not followed, business judgment rule would
not apply under the facts of this case because the directors stand to derive a
personal benefit from their participation in the exchange offer which will not be
shared by all shareholders generally.
Id. at 19 (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 19.
187. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985).
188. Id. at 954-55.
189. Id. at 956-57.
190. In support of its holding, the court noted that:
Mesa, while pursuing its own interests, has acted in a manner which a board
consisting of a majority of independent directors has reasonably determined to
be contrary to the best interests of Unocal and its other shareholders. In this
situation, there is no support in Delaware law for the proposition that, when
responding to a perceived harm, a corporation must guarantee a benefit to a
stockholder who is deliberately provoking the danger being addressed. There is
no obligation of self-sacrifice by a corporation and its shareholders in the face of
such a challenge.
Under those circumstances the board's action is entitled to be measured by the
standards of the business judgment rule. Thus, unless it is shown by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the directors' decisions were primarily based on
perpetuating themselves in office, or some other breach of fiduciary duty such as
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of Delaware's decision, and vacated the injunction. 9'
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision goes beyond merely
approving a self tender that excludes a raider as a defensive tech-
nique to a hostile takeover attempt. The Unocal court seems to as-
sert the principle that a board of directors' duty to protect the corpo-
ration's interests and those shareholders who are sympathetic to
management is superior to the duty to protect all shareholders
equally. 92 Some argue that the court appeared to take a bifurcated
approach to the evaluation of a board's duty to the corporation's
shareholders. Those shareholders who "agree with the interests of
the corporation" or management are covered by the board's duty to
protect the entity's shareholders, but those who are perceived to be a
threat to the corporation or management are not covered by this
duty. '9 It can be argued, however, that the Unocal decision consti-
tutes a license to discriminate 9" against anyone who is perceived to
be a threat to the corporation. 95
The Delaware Supreme Court seems to indicate that discrimi-
nation against a shareholder who is unreasonably perceived by a
board of directors as a threat to the corporation's interest will be
fraud, overreaching, lack of good faith, or being uninformed, a Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the board.
Id. at 958.
191. Id. at 959.
192. Note, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.: A New Era of Fiduciary Duty, 38
BAYLOR L. REV. 687, 706 (1986).
193. Id. at 707. Other commentators argue that the Unocal opinion is more a reflection
of the Delaware Supreme Court's hostility towards two-tier offers, which it believes are coer-
cive. Dennis, Valuing the Firm and the Development of Delaware Corporate Law, 17
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 36-37 (1985).
194. Dennis, supra note 193, at 36-37. Furthermore, that seems to be precisely the pur-
pose behind the recent amendment to the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law. See 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1906 (Purdon Supp. 1989). Indeed, this statutory section provides that:
An amendment or plan may contain a provision classifying the holders of
shares of a class or series into one or more separate groups by reference to any
facts or circumstances that are not manifestly unreasonable and providing
mandatory treatment for shares of the class or series held by particular share-
holders or groups of shareholders that differs materially from the treatment ac-
corded other shareholders or groups of shareholders holding shares of the same
class or series ....
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1906(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989). The drafters' commentary to this
section provides that:
[t]his section authorizes "black hat-white hat" treatment of shareholders, and
the facts or circumstances forming the basis for a disparate treatment of share-
holders are specifically intended to include the identity of the individual
shareholders.
PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMITTEE ON BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS OF THE SECTION
ON CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW, TITLE 15 REVISION SUBCOMMITTEE, BUSI-
NESS CORPORATION LAW OF 1985 WITH OFFICIAL SOURCE NOTES AND COMMITTEE COM-
MENTS 251 (1985) [hereinafter PA BAR ASS'N].
195. PA BAR ASS'N, supra note 194, at 251.
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protected by the business judgment rule.196 The board must simply
act in good faith and with reasonable diligence.
According to the Unocal court, once a board discriminates
against a shareholder based upon good faith and a reasonable inves-
tigation, the business judgment rule insulates the discriminatory ac-
tion unless the "primary purpose" was the board's desire to entrench
itself and maintain control over the corporation. 97 The problem is
determining what is a board of director's "primary purpose" in a
takeover situation. 98 Does "primary" motive mean the sole motive,
the motive of a majority of the board, or the motive of a plurality of
the board?'99 How can a court ascertain the dominance of one par-
ticular motive?200 Furthermore, what if the board puts an undue
amount of weight on its desire to remain in power, but this motive is
not "primary"? 0 '
Once the good faith test articulated by the Delaware Supreme
Court in Unocal is met, the board of directors can discriminate
against a shareholder whom it views as hostile if the board has a
reason that can be articulated. The principle articulated by the Uno-
cal court, even though apparently founded on hostility towards two-
tier tender offers, is not limited to hostile takeover situations. The
discrimination tactic can conceivably be applied to any threat insti-
tuted by a shareholder against a corporate interest.
The Unocal court's endorsement of a corporation's discrimina-
tion of hostile shareholders is another unfounded offshoot of the legal
system's acceptance of the Berle and Means analysis. Since a corpo-
196. Note, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 72 VA. L. REv. 851, 864 (1986) [here-
inafter Note, Unocal].
197. Note, Corporate Law, supra note 174, at 306. Indeed, such was the case in EAC
Indus. v. Frantz Mfg. Corp., No. 85-8003 (Del. Ch. June 28, 1985) (LEXIS, States library,
De file), in which the Delaware Chancery Court held that the funding of an employee's stock
ownership plan to acquire the defendant corporation's stock after the majority of its stock had
been acquired by a raider constituted a discriminatory maneuver whose sole purpose was the
entrenchment of current management and which was not protected by the business judgment
rule. Accord, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
(board of director's failure to protect the rights of Revlon's shareholders to obtain the best
price for their stock when it became clear that the breakup of the company was inevitable by
favoring bondholders held impermissible).
198. Note, Corporate Law, supra note 174, at 306.
199. Id. at n.37.
200. Id. Unocal has been read by two prominent commentators to suggest that the "pro-
portionality review" suggested therein is "primarily a formal, rhetorical instruction rather than
a substantive standard of review. Under this reading, the new standard . . . serves chiefly to
signal judicial concern and to invite planners to proceed with their defenses only after con-
structing a record that demonstrates reasonableness and that articulates a 'threat.' " Gilson &
Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is there Substance to
Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 252 (1989).
201. See Note, Unocal, supra note 196, at 867.
SHAREHOLDERS AND THE CORPORATE ENTITY
ration is an entity with interests separate from those of its sharehold-
ers, the corporation's interests should be protected from hostile fac-
tions, including shareholders." 2 A shareholder is a mere investor, a
rentier, whose main concern is the protection of his investment value
and liquidity and who has or should have no further rights. 203
This position is not, however, supportable, even under Berle and
Means' analysis, because it conflicts with a central tenet: the right
not to be discriminated against or abused20 4 is one of the few rights
that shareholders of the modern corporation retain.20 5 Indeed, other
courts have been unwilling to allow such discrimination to occur.20 6
Thus, this particular takeover defensive technique represents the
extreme extrapolation of Berle and Means' analysis. This extrapola-
tion has no support in corporate law, even under Berle and Means'
analysis, and should be abandoned.
VI. Conclusion
Berle and Means' reasoning and perceptions about the nature of
the modern publicly traded corporation enjoy substantial influence in
modern corporate law. Their plea for a renegotiation of the legal
contract between the corporation, shareholders, and management to
reflect the perceived separation between ownership of corporate stock
and control of the corporate entity appears to be substantially imple-
mented in modern corporate regulation. This implementation is ex-
emplified by the entrenchment of corporate control in a minority
group of shareholders, the abandonment of the traditional one-share
one-vote principle, and the creation of super stock with multiple vot-
ing rights. Modern corporate regulation appears to substantially em-
power corporate managers at the expense of shareholders, who are
viewed as predominantly passive investors with a very narrow inter-
est in the corporate entity. In the eyes of Berle and Means, share-
holders are powerless and unimportant because they have lost con-
trol of the voting machinery that elects management and, thus, have
202. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. Interestingly enough, the Delaware
Supreme Court disparagingly refers to a corporation's short term shareholder as a "specula-
tor" whose interests are somehow less worthy of protection than those of long term "investors"
in the corporation. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del. 1985).
204. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
205. Id.
206. In Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (D.C.N.Y. 1985),
the court held that a "rights plan" that created two different categories of shareholders whose
rights would depend on the date on which they acquired their shares constituted an impermis-
sible discrimination. Accord ASARCO Inc. v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985).
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little power to affect or control the actions of management. Perhaps
this view of shareholders furnishes an explanation for the recent ex-
plosion in hostile corporate takeovers, mergers, and acquisitions.
Clearly, the techniques of dual class recapitalization and dis-
criminatory actions against certain shareholders constitute extrapola-
tions of the Berle and Means' analysis of the shareholder vote."'
Berle and Means' prediction of the demise of the shareholder vote
has not occurred. To the contrary, there is evidence that the share-
holder vote is thriving, that shareholders are not powerless and un-
important, that shareholders are regaining control of corporate enti-
ties, and that the separation of ownership and control is
disappearing. Thus, this particular extrapolation appears to be some-
what excessive.
On the other hand, discriminatory treatment by management of
shareholders whose reputation or behavior had indicated a hostile in-
tent to current corporate management, which was approved by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal, appears to be an offshoot of the
legal system's acceptance of the Berle and Means analysis. This
technique, however, conflicts with one of the central tenets of Berle
and Means' analysis: the right not to be discriminated against or
abused is one of the few rights that shareholders of the modern cor-
poration retain.
Berle and Means' theory has been overextended and overap-
plied, and perhaps no longer reflects reality. Specifically, the extra-
polation of the Berle and Means analysis into two takeover defensive
techniques represents an unwise and dangerous precedent. Thus,
Berle and Means' theory relating to the relationship among a corpo-
ration, shareholders, and management should be reconsidered.
207. These two techniques were chosen as examples for discussion and are only two of
the many extrapolations of the Berle and Means analysis of the shareholder vote present in
modern corporate law. The author believes that an examination of any of these other extrapo-
lations of the Berle and Means hypothesis regarding corporate control and the shareholder vote
will yield the same result.
